Selfhood and Visual Images
Here is a short paper I wrote for my Critical Approaches to the Analysis of Art class. It's a comparison of selfhood's impact on visual images under Lacanian mirror stage theory and Buddhism.
warning: it's kind of theoretical.
Lacanian and Buddhist Conceptions of Self
And Their Conclusions for the Primacy of the Image
I’ve been studying Buddhism in another class this semester, so one of the most essential aspects of Lacan that seemed troubling to me in this week’s readings was his conception of the self as an unchanging permanent characteristic that emerges in the moment of visual engagement with one’s reflection in the mirror as a baby. While Lacan places so much emphasis on the significance of this one moment—ultimately the most formative moment of one’s life, it seems—Buddhism sees selfhood as a false construct, or a convenient way of implying existence.
The Buddhist understanding of the term “self,” in fact, is quite similar to Barthes’ theories on the way language is not inherently meaningful but instead acts as an autonomous system that we temporarily inhabit and use. Buddhists see the “I” as a handy way to designate between things that do appear separate, but they recognize that the deep interconnectedness of all things creates an ultimate emptiness in the concept of the self. The self can not exist without everything around it, so it is in fact “empty of a separate self” (Hanh 16). There is no self separate from others: I can not exist without everything else that exists, so because everything else exists, I am in fact non existent.
Lacan, on the other hand, sees the self as the creation of that most important moment of seeing one’s reflection in the mirror. The image created in the mind at that moment of recognition is distinct from the essential self which exists in the interior of the mind. The impossible striving to ameliorate the image of the self with the essential self is the never ending action of our existence.
Several artistic conclusions emerged from our discussion of Lacan in class, and I would like to subject these conclusions to a Buddhist view of selfhood. First of all, we concluded that Lacan’s theory applied to art in that the boundary between self and non self is essential to understanding an image. This conclusion is based on Lacan’s idea of where the image fits in relation to “the gaze” and “the subject of representation” (What is a Picture? 127). The image, an intermediary between the gaze and the subject, prevents the union of self and non self. Even in the case of self portraiture, when the self is the subject that both gazes and is gazed at, the image that is created can never be the self. The image is only an approximation—at best a mirroring—of the self. The gap between this (mirror) image and the self allows art historians and theorists to explore the idea of the imperfection of an image in capturing the essence of a person. In class, we discussed images in this way, referring to failed attempts to use images to replicate the reality of emotions and relationships.
From a Buddhist perspective, the non existence of self (due to the merging of self and other) negates Lacan’s idea about the image existing as the center of the relationship between self and other. Because there is no self, there can be no striving backwards towards that self via representation. Images, then, take on an entirely different meaning, one that eliminates the ego. Instead of the image being the center of knowledge around which the relationships of gaze to subject are defined, the image is simply another strand of interconnectedness, an object whose physical origination must be traced and understood in order to grasp its true nature (meaning). Buddhist visual interpretation, then, can rely far more heavily on materials than on the image. The overarching sense of interconnectedness can also define the image’s maker, helping art historians to understand the individual artist as a being that exists at the intersection of many different points of experience.
Another artistic conclusion following from Lacanian selfhood theory is that following the mirror stage the individual connects with her social realm (other individuals) because of a need to communicate about the gap between the self and the representation. Lacan claims that this need to open up to the social realm is productive in that it encourages language acquisition. The artistic implications of this idea are similar to the previous conception of the image as the center of knowledge acquisition: the image provokes linguistic and thereby social interaction. This definition of the development of the social realm would be rejected by Buddhists, however, because Buddhists believe that the ultimate emptiness of the self is what motivates (and necessitates) connections between individuals. Social interaction, in both Buddhist and Lacanian terms, is motivated by human nature (the nature of the self), but the place of the image in Buddhism is much more external to an understanding of humans and their social interactions. What is important, instead, is the social interaction that is created through the participation in a work of art, and the ways that this work of art can bring people to a greater knowledge of their individual emptiness.
Much of Lacanian theory relies on the assumptions that the self exists, is permanent, and is established in a single moment during childhood. These beliefs allow the image to be placed at the center of conceptions of ego, social relationships, and language and knowledge acquisition. On the other hand, Buddhist conceptions of self place the image on the exterior of the relationship between individuals. While exteriority is identified with the environment and “the other” in Lacanian theory, it is more identified with non human elements like images in Buddhist theory. These differences allow for vastly different priorities in visual images. While representational qualities are of the utmost importance in Lacanian theory, Budhists rely on materials and social consequences of their artwork to conceive of value.
warning: it's kind of theoretical.
Lacanian and Buddhist Conceptions of Self
And Their Conclusions for the Primacy of the Image
I’ve been studying Buddhism in another class this semester, so one of the most essential aspects of Lacan that seemed troubling to me in this week’s readings was his conception of the self as an unchanging permanent characteristic that emerges in the moment of visual engagement with one’s reflection in the mirror as a baby. While Lacan places so much emphasis on the significance of this one moment—ultimately the most formative moment of one’s life, it seems—Buddhism sees selfhood as a false construct, or a convenient way of implying existence.
The Buddhist understanding of the term “self,” in fact, is quite similar to Barthes’ theories on the way language is not inherently meaningful but instead acts as an autonomous system that we temporarily inhabit and use. Buddhists see the “I” as a handy way to designate between things that do appear separate, but they recognize that the deep interconnectedness of all things creates an ultimate emptiness in the concept of the self. The self can not exist without everything around it, so it is in fact “empty of a separate self” (Hanh 16). There is no self separate from others: I can not exist without everything else that exists, so because everything else exists, I am in fact non existent.
Lacan, on the other hand, sees the self as the creation of that most important moment of seeing one’s reflection in the mirror. The image created in the mind at that moment of recognition is distinct from the essential self which exists in the interior of the mind. The impossible striving to ameliorate the image of the self with the essential self is the never ending action of our existence.
Several artistic conclusions emerged from our discussion of Lacan in class, and I would like to subject these conclusions to a Buddhist view of selfhood. First of all, we concluded that Lacan’s theory applied to art in that the boundary between self and non self is essential to understanding an image. This conclusion is based on Lacan’s idea of where the image fits in relation to “the gaze” and “the subject of representation” (What is a Picture? 127). The image, an intermediary between the gaze and the subject, prevents the union of self and non self. Even in the case of self portraiture, when the self is the subject that both gazes and is gazed at, the image that is created can never be the self. The image is only an approximation—at best a mirroring—of the self. The gap between this (mirror) image and the self allows art historians and theorists to explore the idea of the imperfection of an image in capturing the essence of a person. In class, we discussed images in this way, referring to failed attempts to use images to replicate the reality of emotions and relationships.
From a Buddhist perspective, the non existence of self (due to the merging of self and other) negates Lacan’s idea about the image existing as the center of the relationship between self and other. Because there is no self, there can be no striving backwards towards that self via representation. Images, then, take on an entirely different meaning, one that eliminates the ego. Instead of the image being the center of knowledge around which the relationships of gaze to subject are defined, the image is simply another strand of interconnectedness, an object whose physical origination must be traced and understood in order to grasp its true nature (meaning). Buddhist visual interpretation, then, can rely far more heavily on materials than on the image. The overarching sense of interconnectedness can also define the image’s maker, helping art historians to understand the individual artist as a being that exists at the intersection of many different points of experience.
Another artistic conclusion following from Lacanian selfhood theory is that following the mirror stage the individual connects with her social realm (other individuals) because of a need to communicate about the gap between the self and the representation. Lacan claims that this need to open up to the social realm is productive in that it encourages language acquisition. The artistic implications of this idea are similar to the previous conception of the image as the center of knowledge acquisition: the image provokes linguistic and thereby social interaction. This definition of the development of the social realm would be rejected by Buddhists, however, because Buddhists believe that the ultimate emptiness of the self is what motivates (and necessitates) connections between individuals. Social interaction, in both Buddhist and Lacanian terms, is motivated by human nature (the nature of the self), but the place of the image in Buddhism is much more external to an understanding of humans and their social interactions. What is important, instead, is the social interaction that is created through the participation in a work of art, and the ways that this work of art can bring people to a greater knowledge of their individual emptiness.
Much of Lacanian theory relies on the assumptions that the self exists, is permanent, and is established in a single moment during childhood. These beliefs allow the image to be placed at the center of conceptions of ego, social relationships, and language and knowledge acquisition. On the other hand, Buddhist conceptions of self place the image on the exterior of the relationship between individuals. While exteriority is identified with the environment and “the other” in Lacanian theory, it is more identified with non human elements like images in Buddhist theory. These differences allow for vastly different priorities in visual images. While representational qualities are of the utmost importance in Lacanian theory, Budhists rely on materials and social consequences of their artwork to conceive of value.
posted by Liz @ 6:53 PM
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